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ABSTRACT
Patients, clinicians and managers all want to
be reassured that their healthcare organisation is
safe. But there is no consensus about what we
mean when we ask whether a healthcare
organisation is safe or how this is achieved. In
the UK, the measurement of harm, so important
in the evolution of patient safety, has been
neglected in favour of incident reporting. The
use of softer intelligence for monitoring and
anticipation of problems receives little mention in
official policy. The Francis Inquiry report into
patient treatment at the Mid Staffordshire NHS
Foundation Trust set out 29 recommendations
on measurement, more than on any other topic,
and set the measurement of safety an absolute
priority for healthcare organisations. The Berwick
review found that most healthcare organisations
at present have very little capacity to analyse,
monitor or learn from safety and quality
information. This paper summarises the findings
of a more extensive report and proposes a
framework which can guide clinical teams and
healthcare organisations in the measurement
and monitoring of safety and in reviewing
progress against safety objectives. The
framework has been used so far to promote
self-reflection at both board and clinical team
level, to stimulate an organisational check or
analysis in the gaps of information and to
promote discussion of ‘what could we do
differently’.
INTRODUCTION
Patients, clinicians and managers all want
to be reassured that their healthcare
organisation is safe. The organisation in
question might be a general practice, a
ward or department, or an entire hospital
or healthcare system. But what exactly do
we mean when we ask whether a
healthcare organisation is safe? Anyone
who has ever listened to a board, a clin-
ical meeting or a group of any kind
discuss this question will know that many
different views will be advanced and
defended with passion, if not always with
clarity. This paper summarises the find-
ings of a more extensive report1 and pro-
poses a framework which can guide
boards, clinical teams and healthcare
organisations in using a holistic approach
in the measurement and monitoring of
safety and in reviewing progress against
safety objectives. While our case studies
and our examples are primarily UK
based, we believe that the broader frame-
work should be applicable in other
healthcare systems.
Safety is concerned with the myriad
ways in which a system can fail to func-
tion, which are necessarily vastly more
numerous than the acceptable modes of
functioning. Some of these failures may
be familiar, even predictable, but the
system may also malfunction in unpre-
dictable ways. Safety is partly achieved by
being alert to these perturbations,
responding rapidly to keep things on
track. Doctors, nurses and managers do
this all the time in healthcare, probably
to a greater extent than in any other
industry. But when they succeed, or the
system compensates in other ways, these
actions are in a sense invisible. This sug-
gests that assessing safety will require
looking beyond a set of metrics to consid-
ering how it might be possible to
monitor the functioning of the wider
healthcare system.
In the UK there has been increasing
government focus on assessing both
quality and safety over the past 10 years.2
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A very large number of quality outcomes have been
specified but the approach to safety has been much
narrower, leaving many aspects of safety unexplored.3
The measurement of harm, so important in the evolu-
tion of patient safety, has been almost completely
neglected.4 The use of softer intelligence for monitor-
ing and anticipation of problems receives little
mention in official policy. The Francis Inquiry report
into patient treatment at the Mid Staffordshire NHS
Foundation Trust set out 29 recommendations on
measurement, more than on any other topic, and set
the measurement of safety an absolute priority for
healthcare organisations.5 The Berwick review found
that ‘most health care organisations at present have
very little capacity to analyse, monitor, or learn from
safety and quality information. This gap is costly and
should be closed. Early warning signals can be valued
and should be maintained and heeded’.6 In this paper
we set out proposals for how this might be achieved
in practice.
METHODS
We began by conducting three scoping reviews. These
reviews covered safety measurement in a range of
high risk industries; conceptual approaches and
models of systems safety; and the measurement of
safety in healthcare. Abridged versions of these
reviews became chapters in the main report.1 We also
conducted additional searches on the technical prop-
erties of metrics, safety indicators and the role of
patients and families in monitoring safety. These
reviews used author and keyword searches using
PubMed and internet search engines together with a
review of bibliographic lists to identify relevant publi-
cations. The websites of key organisations were
included where appropriate, enabling us to access
technical reports and guidance documents, for
example those issued by national and state regulators
of different industries.
The scoping reviews on high risk industries and
models of safety drew out the main practical implica-
tions for healthcare. We found that the measurement
and monitoring of safety in other industries has
evolved to encompass both lagging and leading indica-
tors, to examine several different facets of safety and
to use a variety of different methods of assessment
and measurement. The specific tools, techniques and
methods of other industries may not always transfer
easily to healthcare. However, the understanding and
principles behind safety measurement in other indus-
tries informed our approach to healthcare.
We conducted interviews with a range of senior
staff in national organisations in the UK. For our case
studies in healthcare organisations we developed a
template to describe the information we required. We
approached organisations in both the UK and inter-
nationally that we knew to be seriously engaged in the
assessment and improvement of safety. These covered
acute, community, mental health and primary care ser-
vices, and specific services such as obstetrics and
anaesthetics where measurement of safety is well
developed. The case studies were conducted by inter-
views and visits to the organisations or via email
where visits were impractical. To supplement the case
studies we reviewed websites and board papers relat-
ing to patient safety from a range of other NHS trusts
in England.
FINDINGS: FIVE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
What exactly do we want to know when we ask
whether a healthcare organisation is safe? We could
look for a single defining index of safety; we might
think of safety in terms of a set of core standards; we
might seek it in the attitudes and behaviours of staff,
perhaps in terms of safety culture. One reason these
discussions are so difficult is that the underlying ques-
tion has a number of different facets, which are not
always clearly distinguished. A further problem is that
safety is sometimes equated with compliance and
assurance; in contrast we consider that safety must be
approached in the spirit of active inquiry. In consider-
ing the evidence from the scoping reviews and the
case studies we therefore decided that organisational
safety should be approached by posing five fundamen-
tal questions:
▸ Has patient care been safe in the past? We need to assess
rates of past harm to patients, both physical and
psychological.
▸ Are our clinical systems and processes reliable? This is the
reliability of safety critical processes and systems but also
the capacity of the staff to follow safety critical
procedures.
▸ Is care safe today? This is the information and capacity
to monitor safety on an hourly or daily basis. We refer
to this as ‘sensitivity to operations’.
▸ Will care be safe in the future? This refers to the ability
to anticipate, and be prepared for, problems and threats
to safety
▸ Are we responding and improving? The capacity of an
organisation to detect, analyse, integrate, respond and
improve from, safety information
These five core questions lead directly to the five
dimensions of our framework (figure 1): (i) past
harm; (ii) reliability; (iii) sensitivity to operations; (iv)
anticipation and preparedness; and (v) integration and
learning. Table 1 shows some examples of methods
and approaches pertinent to each of the five dimen-
sions. We next summarise some of the key features of
each dimension.
Has care been safe in the past? The measurement of harm
Most patients are vulnerable, to some degree, to infec-
tions, adverse drug events, falls, and the complications
of surgery and other treatments. Patients who are
older, frailer or have several co-morbidities may be
Narrative review
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affected by over-treatment, polypharmacy and other
problems such as delirium, dehydration or malnutri-
tion.7 In mental health suicide, violence and feeling
safe on in-patient units are critical. In any setting
patients may also suffer harm from rare and perhaps
unforeseeable events stemming from new treatments
or new equipment (box 1). To assess harm from health-
care, we ideally have to consider all these kinds of
events.
Healthcare organisations have used a range of
methods and data sources to assess harm. Some
methods, such as record review, attempt to cover a
very broad range of possible types of harm. In con-
trast, patient safety indicators derived from adminis-
trative data reflect highly specific events or processes.
Each of these groups of measures has strengths and
limitations, and none can claim to reflect all the kinds
of harm discussed above.8 Many organisations place
considerable emphasis on standardised mortality, an
important warning sign but problematic as a measure
of preventable harm.9 We need to devise more specific
and more nuanced measures of harm that are relevant
to each clinical setting and also to examine rates of
harm within wards and clinical areas.
Are our clinical systems, processes and behaviour reliable?
Reliability, defined as ‘failure-free operation over
time’, has been a focus of safety critical industries
such as aviation and nuclear power for many years.
The concept of reliability can be applied most mean-
ingfully to relatively standardised aspects of health-
care8 which include procedures that staff need to
carry out reliably. This would include compliance
with hand hygiene procedures, the timely administra-
tion of antibiotics before operations, the timely order-
ing of diagnostic tests and many other fundamental
processes. It also covers clinical systems supporting
the delivery of care, such as the availability of essential
medical records. Many healthcare systems have very
poor reliability. For instance, recent studies showed
that for 15% of patients essential clinical information
was missing at the point when decisions were being
made, and that essential equipment was missing or
faulty in 19% of operations.10 These levels of reliabil-
ity could not be tolerated in other safety critical
industries.
In the English NHS, reliability is typically assessed
through a rolling programme of clinical audits. These
audits are important but, at a local level, the focus can
be haphazard and insufficiently proactive. The next
step for many organisations is to identify all safety crit-
ical processes within each clinical area and specify the
levels of reliability expected. This seemingly simple
step would be a massive transformation in healthcare,
representing a move from gradual improvement
towards an engineering perspective in which systems
are designed to operate to certain specifications under
a range of conditions.11 Staff are unaccustomed to
thinking in terms of standardisation and reliability of
processes that, for example, would come naturally to
engineers. Monitoring reliability across a system would
be a major challenge but is necessary if healthcare is to
take safety seriously.
Is care safe today? Sensitivity to operations
Problems and crises that potentially threaten safety
occur on a daily or even hourly basis, such as a
sudden influx of very sick patients, staff sickness or
equipment breakdowns. We might have been safe yes-
terday but how can we know whether we are safe
today?
Figure 1 A framework for safety measurement and monitoring.
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When we drive a car, operate machinery or cross
the road, we continuously monitor our own actions
and attend to the environment adapting to emerging
hazards. This vision can be expanded to consider how
to monitor the safe running of a healthcare organisa-
tion. ‘Sensitivity to operations’ (with operations refer-
ring to the workings of an organisation, rather than
surgical procedures) describes workers’ acute aware-
ness of the workings of the organisation and sensitiv-
ity to subtle changes and disturbances.12 13 Specific
mechanisms that support sensitivity to operations in
healthcare include safety walk-rounds, handovers and
ward rounds, briefings and debriefings, and informal
conversations. Such conversations are often thought
of as ancillary to the real work of the organisation but
are in fact critical to monitoring safety.
Patient interviews and conversations are a particu-
larly vital form of safety monitoring14 15 and have
been the most potent warning of recent tragedies.
Both the Berwick and Keogh reviews6 9 have empha-
sised the need to seek out the patient voice as an
essential and timely warning sign of deteriorating
care. When patients ask ‘Am I safe?’ they draw to
some extent on their knowledge of the organisation
and available public information. The experience of
safety probably depends very much on their
moment-to-moment experience of care. Safety may be
conveyed more by the manner of the staff, the care
Table 1 Assessing the five dimensions of safety
Dimension Illustrative measures and assessments
Harm
Case record review
Global trigger tool
National audits
Patient safety indicators
Rates of surgical complications
Incidence of falls
Incidence of pressure ulcers
Mortality and morbidity
Reliability of safety critical processes
Observation of safety critical behaviour
Audit of equipment availability
Monitoring of vital signs
Monitoring of stroke care bundles
Venous thromboembolism risk assessment
Assessment of suicide risk
Sensitivity to operations
Safety walk-rounds and conversations
Talking to patients
Ward rounds and routine reviews of patients and working
conditions
Briefings and debriefings
Observation and conversations with clinical teams
Real time monitoring and feedback in anaesthesia
Anticipation and preparedness
Structured reflection
Risk registers
Human reliability analysis
Safety cases
Safety culture assessment
Anticipated staffing levels and skill mix
Integration and learning
Aggregate analysis of incidents, claims and complaints
Feedback and implementation of safety lessons by clinical
teams
Regular integration and review by clinical teams and
general practice
Whole system suites of safety metrics, for example, web
enabled portals clinical unit level
Population level analyses of safety metrics
Box 1 A typology of patient harm
Treatment-specific harm
Harm that results from specific treatments or the man-
agement of a particular disease, with varying degrees of
preventability. This would include adverse drug reactions,
surgical complications, wrong site surgery and the
adverse effects of chemotherapy
Harm due to over-treatment
For example, polypharmacy and the consequent drug
interactions are a major hazard, in that the benefits
received from multiple treatments can be outweighed by
the risks and adverse consequences
General harm from healthcare
Hospital-acquired infections, falls, delirium and dehydra-
tion are examples of problems that can affect any patient
with a serious illness. Frailties or co-morbidities that
increase vulnerability to falls, infections and so on
Harm resulting from delayed or inadequate diagnosis
A cancer diagnosis may be delayed because the patient
delayed contacting their doctor or because the physician
failed to refer. In either case the outcome may be poorer.
To the patient this is harm, although not necessarily gen-
erally considered as an aspect of patient safety
Harm due to failure to provide appropriate treatment
Many patients fail to receive standard evidence-based
care which may lead to harm; failure to provide rapid
thrombolytic treatment for stroke provides an example.
Such problems may be viewed as poor quality care,
rather than safety, but for the patient may represent
avoidable harm
Psychological harm and feeling unsafe
Patients may simply feel unsafe on psychiatric in-patient
units and even on general wards. Awareness of unsafe
care may have consequences for the wider population if
it leads to a loss of trust. For instance, people may be
unwilling to have vaccinations, give blood, donate
organs or receive transfusions
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they take, their concern for checking details, and their
empathy and compassion. Highlighting practical diffi-
culties and harms experienced by patients that might
not be immediately obvious to staff, such as assump-
tions by staff that a patient has understood the infor-
mation provided at discharge, is important.
Will we be safe in the future? Anticipation and
preparedness
In clinical work, treating complex, fluctuating condi-
tions requires thinking ahead and being prepared to
adjust treatment as the patient’s condition changes.
Considering the safety of an organisation requires a
similar but broader vision. Clinicians and managers
need to anticipate and assess potential hazards and
take action to reduce the risks over time.16 17 Safety,
from this broader perspective, requires anticipation,
preparedness and the ability to intervene to reduce
risks at the ward, department or systems level.
There is no special type of information that is suit-
able or unsuitable for reflecting on future hazards and
potential problems. It is more that questioning needs
to be encouraged, even when things are going well,
creating opportunities for staff to envision scenarios.
Formal approaches can however facilitate the creation
of scenarios and proactive action on potential threat.
These include the use of human reliability analysis,
safety cases and the use of indicators such as safety
culture and mapping of staffing levels to anticipate
potential risks to safety due to staff shortages. We
anticipate that high performing organisations will
make increasing use of formal risk prediction systems
in which staffing levels and other indicators are linked
to assessments of the potential of harm and declining
reliability. A notable finding from our case studies was
that the organisations interviewed so far provided
many fewer examples of ‘anticipation and prepared-
ness’ than the other four classes of safety information
in our conceptual framework.
At an organisational level, anticipation and pre-
paredness is comparatively undeveloped in healthcare
and within the NHS. The different dimensions of
safety and the associated analysis for anticipation need
to be further explored, in both research and practice.
Are we responding and improving? Integration and
learning from safety information
All healthcare organisations will, if they look, discover
numerous incidents and deviations from best practice.
Safe organisations actively seek out such information
and attempt to harness the learning to influence
future functioning. Instead of relying on recommenda-
tions from single incidents or metrics, they integrate
and analyse safety information from across the unit or
organisation and use it to support longer term organ-
isational learning and sustainable improvements.18
Data sources could include: incidents reported,
patient safety indicators derived from administrative
data, complaints, health and safety incidents, inquests,
claims, clinical audits, routine data, observations and
informal conversations with patients, families and
staff.
A safety information reporting system should really
be seen as an ‘information, analysis, learning, feed-
back and action’ system.19 Only a very few healthcare
organisations have achieved this. We found examples
of high performing teams who regularly reviewed a
variety of sources of safety information combining
quantitative measures of harm and reliability com-
bined with the softer intelligence of observation and
conversation. One major healthcare system has
created an online reporting portal for quality and
patient safety. The portal incorporates 80 patient
safety metrics housed in a dimensional database that
allows web-enabled reporting and has the capacity to
produce statistical process control charts on
demand.20
PUTTING THE FRAMEWORK INTO PRACTICE
We recognise that the value of this framework and the
associated report will not become fully apparent until
it has been properly tested in practice. We derived the
basic approach midway through our work and tested
a preliminary version with a number of organisations.
Since the completion of the main report the Health
Foundation has commissioned further reports, com-
mentary and conferences to assess the potential of our
approach.
Initial testing of our approach in workshops in two
acute and one integrated care trusts showed a positive
response from board members, managers and front-
line care-givers. All felt the framework was relevant to
their roles and could see opportunities for its practical
application within their own contexts.21 Board
members felt that the framework provided both struc-
ture and clarity in reflecting on their current approach
to measuring and monitoring safety (see online sup-
plementary box S1). The five dimensions helped view
patient safety activities and information through dif-
ferent ‘lenses’ and to widen their thinking about
safety, particularly sensitivity to operations and antici-
pation and preparedness.21 Rather than being led by
available data, board members were able to approach
the measurement and monitoring of safety in a more
holistic way, which in turn enabled the identification
of gaps in their knowledge both at board level and in
specific clinical settings. The framework has therefore
been used to promote self-reflection at both board
and clinical team level, to stimulate an organisational
check or gap analysis and to promote discussion of
‘what could we do differently to address the identified
measurement and monitoring gaps?’.
Feedback from focus group workshops with front-
line clinical staff showed that the framework sup-
ported reflective thinking and broadened participants’
understanding of patient safety measures. The five
Narrative review
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dimensions helped clarify why different data and
activities were undertaken, and provided a forum for
debating whether or not some measurement activities
were useful. A particular benefit was in stimulating
discussion on the purpose of different kinds of mea-
sures and activities, for instance separating measures
of harm from information that identified vulnerabil-
ities in the system and enabled learning.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
While measures of quality and cost are relatively well
established, the measurement and monitoring of
safety continues to be problematic. We believe that
conceptual clarity is an absolute prerequisite for effi-
cient practical action and hope that our approach
offers an effective way forward. We believe that this
framework encompasses the principal facets of safety
and will provide a guide for clinical teams and organi-
sations. We recognise however that both the value and
the limitations of our approach will only become
apparent with further use and testing. Some important
questions for future research are: ‘Are some of the five
dimensions more important to maintain a safe health-
care organisation than others?’ ‘What is the impact of
weakness on one dimension on overall organisational
safety?’ ‘How do the five dimensions relate to each
other?’ and ‘How can boards and clinical teams use
the framework to improve their approach to measur-
ing and monitoring safety?’
In addition to providing a mode of exploration, our
report has some immediate practical implications.
In the main report we set out 10 guiding principles
(box 2) for safety assessment and monitoring which
summarised some of the lessons we had learned
during our reviews and case studies. Here we focus on
the most immediate lessons.
First, it is necessary to abandon the search for a
single measure of safety. Boards sometimes search for
the elusive single measure of safety that, if in bounds,
will enable them to sleep well. We believe that this is a
Box 2 Ten guiding principles for safety measurement and monitoring
1. A single measure of safety is a fantasy. The search for simple metrics has sometimes led organisations to use a
single specific measure, such as standardised mortality, as a generic indicator of safety performance. However, safety
cannot be encapsulated in a single measure and such an approach gives false reassurance
2. Safety monitoring is critical and does not receive sufficient recognition. Leaders at all levels need time to walk, to
talk, to monitor and to intervene when necessary. Patients and carers play an essential role in safety monitoring but
are an underused resource
3. Anticipation and proactive approaches to safety. More evolved safety measurement systems combining both lagging
(after the event) and leading (before an event) indicators. In healthcare leading indicators are still very rare
4. Integration and learning: invest in technology and expertise in data analysis. Safety information is fragmented within
NHS organisations and across the wider system. Probably the greatest challenge is to integrate it into a useable and
comprehensible format
5. Mapping safety measurement and monitoring across the organisation. Safety measurement and monitoring must be
examined within each clinical setting. In each clinical context, we need to consider what kinds of harm are prevalent,
what features of care must be reliable, and how we monitor, anticipate and integrate safety information
6. A blend of externally required metrics and local development. Many measures indices should be agreed nationally or
even internationally, though can be complemented by locally developed measures. But day-to-day monitoring, antici-
pation and preparedness are necessarily local activities, whether at the ward or board level
7. Clarity of purpose is needed when developing safety measures. Healthcare regulators, national agencies and commis-
sioners need to consider the purpose of safety measures. They need to beware of excessively complex data collection
and must test safety measures before implementation
8. Empowering and devolving responsibility for the development and monitoring of safety metrics is essential. Clinical
units need the flexibility to develop measures that are relevant and adapted to their clinical context. Healthcare regu-
lators need to move towards a goal-setting approach that allows organisations some flexibility in how they demon-
strate that their care is safe
9. Collaboration between regulators and the regulated is critical. The fragmentation of key safety information across
multiple national and local stakeholders, combined with the complex regulatory landscape are potential threats to
safety. Considerable resource is devoted to meeting multiple external demands, to the detriment of critical activities
such as monitoring, anticipation and improvement
10. Beware of perverse incentives. Some types of measurement introduce perverse incentives that can lead to box ticking
or other unwanted behaviour. For example, imposing financial penalties may promote under-reporting or excessive
focus on one type of harm. Instead, we need a more holistic approach to measurement and monitoring
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fantasy—an understandable one but a fantasy never-
theless. In most organisations there are just too many
different activities, too many different dimensions of
safety and too many factors that influence safety.
Second, it is tempting, but not desirable, to examine
the available metrics as a starting point. In contrast,
we advise starting from the workplace. What kinds of
harm are prevalent in this environment? What are the
safety critical processes? What are the daily threats to
safety? The framework provides a structure for this
enquiry and some examples of information and pro-
cesses to support safety.
Third, prioritise safety monitoring as an activity.
Time to walk, talk and watch is critical to monitoring
and maintaining safety as are handovers, debriefing
and other methods of team reflection. Patients, carers
and others play a particularly critical role in this
regard both in monitoring their own safety and in the
wider safety of the healthcare system. While regulators
struggle with intermittent visits and a lack of timely
data, patients have immediate experience of poor or
dangerous care.
Fourth, review your capacity for analysis, reflection
and learning and at both unit and organisation level.
Many healthcare organisations have very little capacity
for analysing or learning from safety and quality infor-
mation. This completely obvious, but little remarked,
fact underlies the inability of many organisations to
effectively monitor safety and quality. (Compare the
number and salaries of those monitoring safety and
quality in your organisation with the number and sal-
aries of those monitoring finances.)
Fifth, the area of greatest weakness for most organi-
sations appears to be the capacity to anticipate and
prepare for threats to safety. Some methods, such as
safety cases, are already available to support anticipa-
tion of hazards, and the analysis of known indicators,
such as staffing levels, is likely to be particularly crit-
ical. There is certainly a need for more research into
this particular organisational capacity, but systematic
and deliberate reflection on potential threats is
undoubtedly of considerable value.
We recognise that this framework and the approach
it provides to safety needs to be tested in practice and
its value assessed by a wide range of clinicians, man-
agers and others. Like other frameworks, its true
worth and impact will only gradually be discerned.21
We hope however that it may play a part in a more
general shift from simple reliance on regulatory com-
pliance as the guarantor of safety to a more proactive
approach to safety measurement and monitoring. We
believe that the primary question posed by regulators
should be not ‘Show us how you are complying with
our standards’, but ‘Demonstrate your organisation’s
approach to safety measurement and monitoring’.
When healthcare organisations can do this effectively
we will see a new maturity in the overall approach to
patient safety.
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